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ARTICLE
IMPROPER SELECTION: A SEPARATE GROUND OF PATENT INVALIDITY IN
CANADA?
Anna Wilkinson

*

This paper will consider the principle grounds on which the validity of
selection patents are attacked, namely anticipation, obviousness, double
patenting, lack of utility and insufficiency, with a view to exploring the
doctrinal underpinnings for challenging a selection patent as an “improper
selection”. As will be discussed further below, “improper selection”
comfortably fits within existing grounds of invalidity and, in particular,
obviousness, lack of utility and, surprisingly, ambiguity.

I
SELECTION PATENTS
A definition of a selection patent was provided by Rothstein J.,
speaking for the Court, in the recent Supreme Court decision of
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.1:
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participates in preparing intellectual property due diligence reports.
1 (2008), 69 CPR (4th) 251 (SCC) [ Sanofi-Synthelabo].
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In the context of chemical compounds, in general terms, a
selection patent is one whose subject matter (compounds) is
a fraction of a larger known class of compounds which was
the subject matter of a prior patent. 2

Rothstein J. referred to the following three criteria from In
Re: I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.‟s Patents3 as the locus classicus of
selection patents:
1. There must be a substantial advantage to be secured or
disadvantage to be avoided by the use of the selected
members.
2. The whole of the selected members (subject to "a few
exceptions here and there") possess the advantage in
question.
3. The selection must be in respect of a quality of a special
character peculiar to the selected group. If further research
revealed a small number of unselected compounds
possessing the same advantage, that would not invalidate
the selection patent. However, if research showed that a
larger number of unselected compounds possessed the same
advantage, the quality of the compound claimed in the
selection patent would not be of a special character. 4

While these principles appear to have informed the Court‟s
analysis, Rothstein J. examined the validity of the patent-in-suit with
regard to the principles of anticipation, obviousness, and doublepatenting. The “special advantages” of the claimed compound were
examined in connection with these inquiries and not as a stand-alone
ground of patentability.
A valid selection may be “from a class of thousands or for a
selection of one out of two”.5

2

Ibid at 254-255.

(1930), 47 R.P.C. 289 (Ch.D.) [I.G. Farbenindustrie].
Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 257.
5 See e.g. Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2006), 52 CPR (4th) 241,
(FCA) at 244 (leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 355) citing I.G.
3
4
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Selection patents “exist to encourage researchers to further use
their inventive skills so as to discover new advantages for compounds
within the known class.”6
Selection patents are subject generally to the same rules that
apply to any other type of patent.7
II
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
Not surprisingly, many selection patents are directed to
pharmaceuticals. In Canada, there is a regulatory regime specific to
pharmaceuticals that links the patent system with the regulatory
approval system. Some key features of this system are explained here
in order to provide context for the case law discussion that follows.
Before a drug product can be marketed in Canada,
authorization must be obtained from the Minister of Health. Upon
achieving regulatory approval, the Minister issues a Drug
Identification Number or DIN and a Notice of Compliance (“NOC”).
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations8 require
the Minister of Health to maintain a register of patents pertaining to
medicines for which Notices of Compliance have been issued (the
“Patent Register”).9 The owner or licensee of a patent for a medicine
who files a drug submission can seek to add the relevant patent(s) to
the Patent Register by filing a patent list.10 If a second or subsequent
entry drug manufacturer seeks a NOC in respect of a drug and in
doing so directly or indirectly compares the drug with a drug on the
Patent Register, with respect to each patent referenced on the Patent
Register, the second or subsequent entry drug manufacturer must file
a statement of acceptance that the NOC will not issue until the patent
expires or an allegation that: the person appearing on the patent list is

Farbenindustrie and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Akzo NV [1982] F.S.R. 303
(HL).
6 See e.g. Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) , supra note 5 at 244.
7 See e.g. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. et al. and Pharmascience Inc. et al. (2008), 72 CPR
(4th) 295 (FCTD) at 318 [GlaxoSmithKline], and Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at
282.
8 SOR/93-133 as amended.
9 Ibid. s.3(2).
10 Ibid. at s.4(1) and s.4(4)(d).
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not the patentee or a person claiming under the patentee; the patent
has expired; the patent is not valid; or the patent is not infringed.11
Within 45 days of service of this “Notice of Allegation”, the patentee
or licensee can bring an application in the Federal Court for an order
prohibiting the Minister from issuing a NOC until after the patent
expires.12 This application is associated with a 24-month stay during
which the Minister is prohibited from issuing a NOC to the second or
subsequent entry drug manufacturer.13 While named in the style of
cause, the Minister does not participate in the hearings of these
applications. In disposing of the application, the Court may make an
order prohibiting the Minister from issuing a NOC until after the
expiration of the patent(s) that are the subject of the application, if it
finds that none of the allegations at issue in the proceeding are
justified or dismiss the application for a prohibition order if it finds
that an allegation is justified.14 Notwithstanding the outcome of these
proceedings, the patentee or licensee can sue the second or
subsequent entry drug manufacturer for patent infringement. It
should be noted that due to their summary nature, decisions arising
out of prohibition proceedings have limited precedential value in
terms of their pronouncements on patent law:
NOC proceedings were never intended to be substitutes for
an infringement action…Similarly, it is inappropriate to
rely on NOC proceedings to set binding precedent on
controversial and uncertain questions in patent law
[citations omitted].15

III
ANTICIPATION
A patent is to be granted for an “invention” defined by the

Patent Act16 as “any new and useful art, process, machine,
Ibid. s.5.
Ibid. s.6(1).
13 Ibid. s.7(1)(e).
14 Ibid. s.6(2).
15 Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd . (2007), 62 CPR (4th) 161 at 176, leave to
appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 9.
16 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, as amended [Act].
11
12
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manufacture or composition of matter” or improvement thereof.17
Section 28.2 of the current Act provides a specific framework for
assessing the novelty of a Canadian patent.
The test for anticipation has been given various formulations.
One frequently cited formulation of the test is that provided by
Hugessen J.A. speaking for the Federal Court of Appeal in the decision
of Beloit Canada Ltd. et al. v. Valmet Oy18:
One must, in effect, be able to look at a prior, single
publication and find in it all the information which, for
practical purposes, is needed to produce the claimed
invention without the exercise of any inventive skill. The
prior publication must contain so clear a direction that a
skilled person reading and following it would in every case
and without possibility of error be led to the claimed
invention.19

IV
ANTICIPATION AND SELECTION PATENTS
In Sanofi-Synthelabo, Sanofi sought an order prohibiting the
Minister of Health from issuing a NOC to Apotex in respect of
clopidogrel bisulfate, marketed by Sanofi as PLAVIX. Sanofi held two
Canadian patents: the genus patent 1,194,875 (the “875 Patent”)
which disclosed more than 250,000 possible compounds and patent
1,336,777 (the “777 Patent”), which disclosed and claimed clopidogrel
bisulfate, the dextro-rotary isomer of a racemate made and tested in
the 875 Patent. Apotex alleged invalidity on the grounds of
anticipation, obviousness and double patenting. The Applications
Judge did not find the allegations to be justified and granted the order
of prohibition.20 The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Apotex‟s
appeal.21 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Accepting that selection patents were permitted in principle,
Rothstein J. speaking for the Supreme Court considered the question
17

Ibid. s.2 (emphasis added).

(1986) 8 CPR (3d) 289 (FCA) [Beloit].
Ibid. at 297.
20 (2005), 39 CPR (4th) 202 (FCTD).
21 (2006), 59 CPR (4th) 46 (FCA).
18
19
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of anticipation in the context of selection patents.22 He found that the
Applications Judge “overstated the stringency of the test for
anticipation that the “exact invention” has already been made and
publicly disclosed”23 and went on to formulate a two-part test for
anticipation:
When considering the role of the person skilled in the art in
respect of disclosure, the skilled person is "taken to be
trying to understand what the author of the description [in
the prior patent] meant"…At this stage, there is no room for
trial and error or experimentation by the skilled person. He
is simply reading the prior patent for the purposes of
understanding it.
If the disclosure requirement is satisfied, the
second requirement to prove anticipation is "enablement"
which means that the person skilled in the art would have
been able to perform the invention [.]24

Trial and error experimentation is permitted at the second
stage, but not at the initial disclosure stage:
Once the subject matter of the invention is disclosed by the
prior patent, the person skilled in the art is assumed to be
willing to make trial and error experiments to get it to
work. While trial and error experimentation is permitted at
the enablement stage, it is not at the disclosure stage. For
purposes of enablement, the question is no longer what the
skilled person would think the disclosure of the prior patent
meant, but whether he or she would be able to work the
invention.25

While permitted at the second stage, experimentation must be
such that can be performed without undue burden.26

Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 259-260.
Ibid. at 261.
24 Ibid. at 261.
25 Ibid. at 262.
26 Ibid. at 263.
22
23
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Rothstein J. identified this two-part approach as a refinement
of the Beloit test for anticipation:
The Beloit decision by which the applications judge rightly
felt bound dealt with only one aspect of anticipation, that is,
whether or not the invention in a patent had been disclosed
in a single prior publication or patent. In that decision,
Hugessen J.A. held that it had not. He had no need to
consider the further point whether or not, had there been
such a clear disclosure, the working of the invention was
also enabled by that disclosure. That point was not in issue
in Beloit. Explicitly separating disclosure and enablement is
a refinement of the approach set out in Beloit.27

Rothstein J. went on to consider what must be disclosed by
the prior art genus patent to constitute anticipation:
In the context of genus and selection patents, in E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. (Witsiepe‟s) Application, [1982]
F.S.R. 303 (H.L.), Lord Wilberforce stated, at p. 311:
It is the absence of the discovery of the special
advantages, as well as the fact of non-making, that makes it
possible for such persons to make an invention related to a
member of the class.
The compound made for the selection patent was
only soundly predicted at the time of the genus patent. It
was not made and its special advantages were not known. It
is for those reasons that a patent should not be denied to the
inventor who made and discovered the special advantages
of the selection compound for the first time.
In the context of disclosure as explained in
Synthon, "the absence of the discovery of the special
advantages" to which Lord Wilberforce was referring in
Witsiepe's means that the genus patent does not disclose the
special advantages of the invention covered by the selection
patent. Where there is no such disclosure, there is no
discovery of the special advantages of the selection patent as
compared to the genus patent, and the disclosure

27

Ibid. at 262.
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requirement to prove anticipation fails. At this stage, the
person skilled in the art is reading the prior patent to
understand whether it discloses the special advantages of
the second invention. No trial and error is permitted. If in
reading the genus patent the special advantages of the
invention of the selection patent are not disclosed, the
genus patent does not anticipate the selection patent.
[Emphasis added]28

Rothstein J. found no anticipation on the basis that the prior
art genus patent did not amount to disclosure so as to satisfy the first
stage of the anticipation test.
Accordingly, in the case of a true selection, i.e. one where the
selected compound has not been made nor its advantage(s) disclosed
in the prior art, there will be no anticipation because the first part of
the two-part test for anticipation (disclosure) will not be satisfied.
In the recent decision of Lundbeck Canada Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Health) 29, Harrington J. granted an order of prohibition
preventing the Minister of Health from issuing a NOC to Genpharm,
Apotex and Cobalt in respect of a generic version of Lundbeck‟s
escitalopram drug until the expiry of Canadian Patent No. 1,339,452
(“452 Patent”). While three separate proceedings were brought against
the generic companies, the proceedings were heard consecutively and
the Court issued one decision. All three generic companies alleged
the 452 Patent was an invalid selection patent from one or more
issued U.S. Patents. The U.S. Patents claimed citalopram, a racemate,
while the 452 Patent claimed escitalopram, the S-enantiomer of
citalopram. The Court found that the 452 Patent was not a selection
patent on the basis that the prior genus patents did not disclose
escitalopram, so the 452 Patent did not need to meet the requirements
of a selection patent. The Court noted that if it had determined that
the 452 Patent was a selection patent, it would have been invalid for
not satisfying the requirements of a selection patent. Accordingly, an
available defence to an allegation of improper selection may be that
the prior patent does not cover the claimed selection even in a generic
way.

28

Ibid. at 263.
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(2009), 73 CPR (4th) 69 (FCTD).

26

V
OBVIOUSNESS
Historically the requirement for inventiveness (or “lack of
obviousness”) was a judge-made requirement derived from the
requirement that patents be granted for “inventions”.30 The
requirement that an invention must not be obvious is now a statutory
requirement under section 28.3 of the Act.
A commonly cited test for obviousness is that provided by
Hugessen J.A. in Beloit:
The test for obviousness is not to ask what competent
inventors did or would have done to solve the problem.
Inventors are by definition inventive. The classical
touchstone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the
art but having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a
paragon of deduction and dexterity, wholly devoid of
intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right.
The question to be asked is whether this mythical creature
(the man in the Clapham omnibus of patent law) would, in
the light of the state of the art and the common general
knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come
directly and without difficulty to the solution taught by the
patent. It is a very difficult test to satisfy.31

VI
OBVIOUSNESS AND SELECTION PATENTS
The Beloit test for obviousness was revisited by the Supreme
Court in Sanofi-Synthelabo. The Court considered whether the
“obvious to try” standard was part of Canadian law. Looking to the
law in foreign jurisdictions, the Court decided the obviousness
standard should be reconsidered in Canada and, in particular, the
restrictiveness with which the Beloit test had been interpreted.32

See e.g. Hughes and Woodley on Patents (Loose-Leaf), 2008 LexisNexis Canada Inc.
[Hughes & Woodley] at §12.
31 Beloit, supra note 18 at 294.
32 Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra at 270.
30
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The Court held that the “obvious to try” test could be
considered, but it “must be approached cautiously” and is “only one
factor to assist in the obviousness inquiry”.33 Rothstein J. formulated
the test thus:
I am of the opinion that the "obvious to try" test will work
only where it is very plain or, to use the words of Jacob L.J.,
more or less self-evident that what is being tested ought to
work.
For a finding that an invention was "obvious to try", there
must be evidence to convince a judge on a balance of
probabilities that it was more or less self-evident to try to
obtain the invention. Mere possibility that something might
turn up is not enough.34

Rothstein J. went on to adopt the four-step obviousness
inquiry outlined by Oliver L.J. in Windsurfing International Inc. v.
Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd.35, as updated by Jacob L.J. in Pozzoli
SPA v. BDMO SA36,:
In the result I would restate the Windsurfing questions
thus:
(1) (a) Identify the notional "person skilled in the art";
(1) (b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of
that person;
(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question
or if that cannot readily be done, construe it;
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the
matter cited as forming part of the "state of the art" and the
inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention
as claimed, do those differences constitute steps which
would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or

33
34
35
36

Ibid. at 271.
Ibid. at 271-272.
[1985] R.P.R. 59 (C.A.).
[2007] F.S.R. 37, [2007] EWCA Civ 588.
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do they require any degree of invention? [Emphasis
added]37

Rothstein J. identified the fourth step as being where the issue
of “obvious to try” will arise and identified a list of non-exhaustive
factors that should be considered in this step of the inquiry.38,39
In applying the four-step obviousness analysis, Rothstein J.
looked to the specification of the 777 Patent to find the “inventive
concept”:
The inventive concept of the claims is not readily
discernable from the claims themselves. A bare chemical
formula in a patent claim may not be sufficient to
determine its inventiveness. In such cases, I think it must be
acceptable to read the specification in the patent to
determine the inventive concept of the claims. Of course, it
is not permissible to read the specification in order to
construe the claims more narrowly or widely than the text
will allow.
In the present case, it is apparent that the inventive
concept of the claims in the „777 patent is a compound
useful in inhibiting platelet aggregation which has greater
therapeutic effect and less toxicity than the other
compounds of the „875 patent and the methods for
obtaining that compound.[Emphasis added] 40

37
38

Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 272.
Ibid. at 273.

The “obvious to try” standard as formulated by Rothstein J. was recently explained
in the Federal Court of Appeal decision of Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Canada Inc. and Pfizer
Ireland Pharmaceuticals and The Minister of Health (2009), 72 CPR (4th) 141. In this
case, the appellant argued that the Court in Sanofi-Synthelabo had incorporated a
“worth a try” test into Canadian law. Noel J. speaking for the Court characterized the
test adopted by the Supreme Court as “a precise application of the test loosely referred
to as „worth a try‟”:
The test recognized is “obvious to try” where the word “obvious”
means “very plain”. According to this test, an invention is not
made obvious because the prior art would have alerted the person
skilled in the art to the possibility that something might be worth
trying. The invention must be more or less self-evident. (at paras.
28-29).
40 Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 274-275.
39
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Accordingly, in selection patents the inventive concept of the
claim (that which renders it inventive) is the advantage of the
selection over the genus, which may be found with reference to the
description. A proper selection, i.e. one with an actual and discernible
advantage, will be inventive over the genus patent.
VII
DOUBLE PATENTING
The rationale for the prohibition against double patenting was
outlined by Binnie J. speaking for the Supreme Court in the decision
of Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc.41:
It is common ground that the bargain between the patentee
and the public is in the interest of both sides only if the
patent owner acquires real protection in exchange for
disclosure, and the public does not for its part surrender a
more extended monopoly than the statutory 17 years from
the date of the patent grant (now 20 years from the date of
the filing of the patent application). A patentee who can
"evergreen" a single invention through successive patents by
the expedient of obvious or uninventive additions prolongs
its monopoly beyond what the public has agreed to pay. 42

In considering a double patenting objection, it is the claims of
the two patents that are compared.
The prohibition against double patenting relates back to the
"evergreen" problem mentioned at the outset. The inventor
is only entitled to "a" patent for each invention: Patent Act,
s. 36(1).43 If a subsequent patent issues with identical claims,
there is an improper extension of the monopoly. It is clear
that the prohibition against double patenting involves a

(2000), 9 CPR (4th) 129 (SCC) [Whirlpool].
Ibid. at 144.
43 Subsection 36(1) of the Act provides: “A patent shall be granted for one invention
only but in an action or other proceeding a patent shall not be deemed to be invalid
by reason only that it has been granted for more than one invention.”
41
42
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comparison of the claims rather than the disclosure, because
it is the claims that define the monopoly. The question is
how "identical" must be the claims in the subsequent patent
to justify invalidation.44

In Whirlpool, Binnie J. identified two branches of double
patenting: coterminous and obviousness-type. Binnie J. pointed to the
decision of Beecham Canada Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Co.45 where the
Federal Court of Appeal adopted the "identical or coterminous"
standard and then distinguished this branch from the broader
obviousness-type double patenting:
There is, however, a second branch of the prohibition
which is sometimes called "obviousness" double patenting.
This is a more flexible and less literal test that prohibits the
issuance of a second patent with claims that are not
"patentably distinct" from those of the earlier patent. …
In Consolboard…Dickson J. referred to Farbwerke
Hoechst as "the main authority on double patenting" …
which stood for the proposition that a second patent could
not be justified unless the claims exhibited "novelty or
ingenuity" over the first patent…46

VIII
DOUBLE PATENTING AND SELECTION PATENTS
Given the nature of selection patents, it is not surprising that
double patenting is frequently raised as a ground of invalidity. In
Sanofi-Synthelabo, Rothstein J. rejected the proposition that a general
concern about evergreening justified an attack on the doctrine of
selection patents, giving two reasons:
First, a selection patent may be sought by a party other than
the inventor or owner of the original genus patent. In such

44

Whirlpool, supra note 41 at 157.

45

(1982), 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (FCA).
Whirlpool, supra note 41 at 158.

46
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a case, anticipation or obviousness may be an issue, but
evergreening does not arise.47
…
Second and more importantly, selection patents
encourage improvements by selection. The inventor selects
only a bit of the subject matter of the original genus patent
because that bit does something better than and different
from what was claimed in the genus patent. 48

Rothstein

J. went

on to

consider

the

Whirlpool decision:
Apotex argues that the focus in a double patenting
challenge is on the claims of the two patents rather than on
the disclosure. I agree. In Whirlpool, Binnie J. stated, at
para. 63:
It is clear that the prohibition against double
patenting involves a comparison of the claims rather than
the disclosure, because it is the claims that define the
monopoly.

Whirlpool was not a selection patent case.
However, because selection patents are to be subject to the
same considerations as other patents, the clear statement of
Binnie J. in Whirlpool must apply to selection patents.
I agree with Apotex that a challenge to patent
validity based on double patenting does not require the
existence of identical language in the two patent claims.
Even so, the wording of the claims, however different, must
claim the same invention.
The invention defined by claim 14 of the '875
patent is not the same as the invention claimed by claim 1
of the '777 patent because the former is broader than the
latter. [Emphasis added]49

In finding no double patenting, Rothstein J.
explained the decision as follows:
Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 279.
Ibid. at 280.
49 Ibid. at 282.
47
48
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A selection patent that claims a compound that is
patentably distinct from the genus patent will not be invalid
for obviousness double patenting. Here, out of the many
compounds predicted to be effective as exhibiting platelet
aggregation inhibiting activity in the '875 patent, it was
found that the dextro-rotatory isomer of the racemate
relevant in this case had beneficial properties over both the
racemate and the levo-rotatory isomer. As I have explained
above, the claims in the '777 patent reflect a patentably
distinct compound from the compounds in the '875 patent.
As a result, there is no basis for a challenge based on
"obviousness" double patenting.
While double patenting requires a comparison of
the claims of a genus and selection patent, it is necessary
that the specification of the selection patent define in clear
terms the nature of the characteristic which the patentee
alleges to be possessed by the selection for which he claims
a monopoly. [Emphasis added]50

Accordingly, where a claimed selection is novel and inventive
over the genus, the selection patent will not be invalid for double
patenting.
IX
UTILITY
Utility is required by the Act. A patent is to be granted for an
“invention”: “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter” or improvement thereof.51
In the Alsop‟s Patent case52, Parker J. recognized that there are
two “types” of utility:
[T]he well-known rule is that utility of an invention
depends upon whether, by following the directions of the
patentee, the result which the patentee professed to

50
51
52

Ibid. at 283-284.
Act, supra note 16 at section 2 (emphasis added).
(1907) 24 R.P.C. 733.

33

produce can in fact be produced…Want of utility in this
sense must however, in my opinion, be distinguished from
want of utility in the sense of the invention being useless
for any purpose whatever. In the case of an invention not
serving any useful purpose at all, the Patent would no doubt
be void, but not entirely for the same reason. 53

Utility does not have to be disclosed in the patent application,
although how to use the invention must be disclosed. Subsections
27(3)(a) and (b) of the Act provide:
Specification. - The specification of an invention must
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor;
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the
method of constructing making, compounding or
using a machine manufacture or composition of
matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art or science to
which it pertains, or with which it is most closely
connected to make, construct, compound or use it;

In Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan)
Ltd. , Dickson J. speaking for the Supreme Court considered s. 36(1), a
precursor to s. 27(3) of the current Act:
54

…the Federal Court of Appeal erred also in holding that s.
36(1) requires distinct indication of the real utility of the
invention in question. There is a helpful discussion in 29
Hals., 3rd ed., p. 59, on the meaning of “not useful” in patent
law. It means “that the invention will not work, either in
the sense that it will not operate at all or, more broadly, that
it will not do what the specification promises that it will
do”. There is no suggestion here that the invention will not
give the result promised. The discussion in Halsbury, ibid.,
continues:

53

Ibid. at 753.

54

(1981), 56 CPR (2d) 145 (SCC) [Consolboard].

34

…the practical usefulness of the invention does not
matter, nor does its commercial utility, unless the
specification promises commercial utility, nor does it matter
whether the invention is of any real benefit to the public, or
particularly suitable for the purposes suggested.
And concludes [at p. 60]:
…it is sufficient utility to support a patent that the
invention gives either a new article, or a better article, or a
cheaper article, or affords the public a useful choice…
Canadian law is to the same effect. 55

In the case of chemical patents, it is possible to satisfy the
utility requirement for compounds that have not been made or tested
through a doctrine of “sound prediction”. The doctrine of sound
prediction has three components: there must be a factual basis for the
prediction; the inventor must have at the date of the patent
application an articulable and "sound" line of reasoning from which
the desired result can be inferred from the factual basis; and there
must be proper disclosure.56
X
UTILITY AND SELECTION PATENTS
The issue of utility in the context of a selection patent was
considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in the decision of Pfizer
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)57 (referred to here as Pfizer
v. Ratiopharm to distinguish it from other cases with Pfizer in the
style of cause). This case involved a selection of besylate salt of
amlodipine (claimed in patent 1,321,393 (the “393 Patent”)) marketed
by Pfizer as NORVASC. The selection was from a class of eighty
pharmaceutically acceptable salts of amlodipine disclosed in a prior
genus patent. The genus patent indicated that the preferred salts were
the maleates. The applicants found these unsuitable for formulation
into a dosage form and sought a replacement salt having an optimal
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Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. (2002), 21 CPR (4th) 499 (SCC) at 526.

(2006), 52 CPR (4th) 241 (FCA), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 335
(also cited supra, note 5) [Pfizer v. Ratiopharm].
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combination of four formulation properties: solubility, stability, nonhygroscopicity and non-stickiness.
Ratiopharm alleged invalidity of the 393 Patent on the basis of
anticipation, obviousness and being an improper selection patent. The
Applications Judge found the patent to be an improper selection,
concluding there was no disclosure of the advantage and that it was
merely a non-patentable exercise in verifying the existing properties
and testing the degree of known characteristics, based on the absence
of explanation or justification for why certain salts from a known class
were tested. The Applications Judge concluded that because the
selection was not valid, the selection patent was invalid for
obviousness-type double patenting and did not grant the order of
prohibition.58
Ratiopharm‟s Notice of Allegation, included an allegation that
besylate offered no substantial or practically significant improvement
in stability over any of the other salts tests in the 393 Patent. With
respect to this allegation, the Applications Judge found the Notice of
Allegation inadequate because it did not include the results of testing
performed by a third party retained by Ratiopharm for that purpose.
The Court of Appeal distinguished verification from empirical
research for the purpose of making a selection from a class:
The empirical investigation leading to an invention
protected by a selection patent must involve "at the least the
discovery that the selected members possess qualities
hitherto undiscovered, particular to themselves and not
attributable to them by virtue of the fact of their belonging
to a class specified by an earlier invention"
…
On the other hand, verification means confirming
predicted or predictable qualities of known compounds; i.e.
components that have already been discovered and made.
No one can claim a selection patent merely for ascertaining
the properties of a known substance...[Citations omitted] 59
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(2006), 46 CPR (4th) 281 (FCTD).
Pfizer v. Ratiopharm, supra note 57 at 247-248.
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In concluding the Applications Judge applied the wrong test,
Malone J.A. for the Court of Appeal noted that the Applications Judge
found that “the Formulation Properties of any salt of amlodipine
could never have been expected but must be determined
empirically”.60 Malone J.A. went on to find that had the Applications
Judge applied the proper principles, he could only have concluded
that the 393 Patent was a valid selection because “of Pfizer‟s
discovery of Besylate‟s special Formulation Properties creating a
special advantage in dosage stability and processability”.61
Under the heading “Special Advantage”,
characterized Ratiopharm‟s argument as follows:

the

Court

Ratiopharm urges that if Pfizer need only assert that the
"unique combination" of Besylate's Formulation Properties
cannot be predicted and therefore possess an unexpected
advantage, then any amlodipine salt selected could be tested
against any number of properties which could theoretically
support a claim to "unique properties" that could not be
predicted. They argue that this is absurd and that more
disclosure details of selection of comparator salts,
Formulation Properties and fully explained thresholds for
acceptable results are essential to support Besylate's special
advantage over the class.62

In rejecting this argument, the Court turned to the statutory
utility requirements:
To meet the statutory requirement in subsection 34(1) of
the Patent Act,63 …that a patent be "useful", the selected
species must have an advantage over the class as a whole …
However, there are no special legal requirements
regarding what particular type of advantage is required. The

Ibid. at 249.
Ibid.
62 Ibid. at 250.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 subsection 34(1) of the “Old Act” recites “An applicant shall in
the specification of his invention (a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor;”.
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test for advantage is understood to include a disadvantage to
be avoided, as is the case here …[Citations omitted] 64

The decision, however, left open the possibility of challenging
the utility on the basis that thresholds could be manipulated, the
Court of Appeal pointing out that there was little evidence on the
issue of thresholds because Ratiopharm had not objected to them
within the Notice of Allegation.
In GlaxoSmithKline65, GlaxoSmithKline and the Wellcome
Foundation (referred to here collectively as “GSK”) sought an order
prohibiting the Minister from issuing a NOC to Pharmascience until
the expiry of Canadian Patent 1,340,083 (the “083 Patent”). GSK
asserted the 083 Patent as a valid selection patent from GSK‟s
European Patent No. 0,099,493 (the “493 Patent”) that would be
infringed if Pharmascience was permitted to produce the antiviral
compound valacyclovir (marketed as VALTREX). Pharmascience
alleged invalidity for anticipation, obviousness, non-utility, double
patenting, lack of invention, insufficiency, disclosure, lack of sound
prediction and improper selection. Barnes J. found that these grounds
“overlapped” and it was not necessary to deal with them in a discrete
way.66 Acyclovir was a known antiviral drug, which although given
orally presented problems of bioavailability. Valacyclovir is a prodrug
formed by the molecular combination of acyclovir with the amino
acid, L-valine. Barnes J. identified the subject matter claimed by the
493 Patent as a genus of aliphatic amino acid esters of acyclovir and
the patent included a statement that the new ester compounds
“surprisingly have an improved water solubility compared with
acyclovir which enables the derivatives to be used to a greater extent
than acyclovir in the formulation of aqueous preparations”.67 The 083
Patent claimed the selection of the compound valacyclovir (the Lvaline ester of acyclovir) asserting that it “surprisingly had improved
bioavailability after oral administration compared with alanine and
glycine esters mentioned [in the 493 Patent]”68. Barnes J. found that

Pfizer v. Ratiopharm, supra note 57 at 251.
GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 7.
66 Ibid. at 298-299.
67 Ibid. at 302.
68 Ibid. at 302-303.
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the bioavailability advantage asserted as the inventive selection of the
083 Patent was neither anticipated nor obvious.
Turning to the issue of utility, Barnes J. noted that “[t]o
establish that a compound has a peculiar advantage over the genus of
compounds from which it was chosen requires that the advantage not
be found or be predicted to be found in a large number of members of
the genus.”69 Barnes J. looked to the Federal Court of Appeal decision
in Pfizer v. Ranbaxy (discussed further below) and found that Nadon
J. indicated that evidence of an unexpected selection advantage over
the compounds covered by the genus patent is a requirement, at least
with respect to establishing utility.70 With respect to the utility of
valacyclovir, Barnes J. found as follows:
The utility of valacyclovir and the other esters of acyclovir
as antiviral prodrugs has already been asserted in the 493
Patent. The specific utility of valacyclovir had to be found,
therefore, not in its antiviral properties or in improved
solubility but in its supposedly better oral bioavailability
profile over the other members of the class from which it
was selected. That utility had to be established either by
testing or by sound prediction or both. If the utility of
valacyclovir for enhanced oral bioavailability over the
genus compounds was not scientifically demonstrated or
soundly predicted as of the Canadian filing date, the 083
Patent must fail for lack of utility…The fact that later
evidence may establish utility does not transform the earlier
speculation into something inventive. [Emphasis added] 71

Barnes J. found that there must be sufficient testing of genus
compounds to support at least a sound prediction of a substantially
unique or peculiar advantage for the selection.72 Barnes J. found GSK‟s
evidence with respect to surprising or unexpected bioavailability to be
insufficient:

Ibid. at 318.
Ibid. at 319.
71 Ibid. at 319-320.
72 Ibid. at 320.
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[T]here is no evidence produced by GSK to establish that
that bioavailability advantage for valacyclovir asserted by
the 083 Patent was then known or predicted to be
substantially unique among the thousands of compounds
claimed by the 493 Patent. For all I can tell from the
evidence, valacyclovir was, at best, shown to have a
qualitative bioavailability advantage over the other two
esters tested but that finding says absolutely nothing about
whether the same advantage would exist vis-à-vis a few,
some, many, most or all of the other compounds claimed by
the 493 Patent. This is hardly a sufficient basis to establish
the legal requirement that a selection be of a special or
peculiar character relative to the genus from which it was
chosen…Another way of putting this is that the selection of
one compound with an unquantified advantage over two
others does not add anything of a substantial character to
the existing knowledge relative to the substantial pool of
other esters of acyclovir named by the 493
Patent…[Citation omitted]73

In holding the allegations of invalidity justified on the basis of
lack of utility, Barnes J. found as follows:
In a pharmaceutical selection patent, the invention is the
discovery of a surprising or unexpected advantage of the
selection over the genus of compounds from which it was
chosen. The utility of such a selection is not found in the
fact that it works to successfully treat some human
condition or ailment but rather that it works surprisingly
better than the compounds monopolized by the genus
patent. That is the inventive promise and the inventive
promise that must be established. 74

In light of the finding with respect to utility, Barnes J. found it
unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the disclosure under s.
27(3), however, looking to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in
Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, Barnes J. noted:

73
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Ibid. at 326.
Ibid. at 328-329.
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The law in the area of disclosure has recently been clarified
to a degree by the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, … which held that, for a selection
patent, the patentee need not disclose anything more than
the surprising and unexpected advantage of the selection.
No data or other evidence to the [sic] support that assertion
is required to be published within the patent. Suffice it to
say, though, that when a patentee is attempting to establish
the utility of a selection by relying upon evidence of sound
prediction, there may be an obligation to disclose in the
patent the underlying facts and the line of reasoning which
support the prediction…
It seems to me that if a patentee is relying on sound
prediction to establish that its selection has some
unexpected advantage over the genus, it does have a
heightened obligation to disclose in the patent its line of
reasoning because that is part of the quid pro quo for the
claimed monopoly over the selection.[Emphasis added]75

XI
SUFFICIENCY AND AMBIGUITY
Subsections 27(3)(a) and (b) of the Act set out the sufficiency
requirement:
Specification. - The specification of an invention must
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor;
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the
method of constructing making, compounding or
using a machine manufacture or composition of
matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art or science to
which it pertains, or with which it is most closely
connected to make, construct, compound or use it;

Subsection 53(1) also deals with the requirements of the
specification, but includes an element of intent to mislead on the part
of the applicant:
75

Ibid. at 330.
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A patent is void if any material allegation in the petition of
the applicant in respect of the patent is untrue, or if the
specification and drawings contain more or less than is
necessary for obtaining the end for which they purport to
be made, and the omission or addition is wilfully made for
the purpose of misleading.

The statutory basis for objecting to claims for ambiguity can be
found in subsection 27(4) of the Act:
Claims. – The specification must end with a claim or claims
defining distinctly and in explicit terms the subject-matter
of the invention for which an exclusive privilege or
property is claimed.

Sufficiency and ambiguity are two different objections and the
standard to meet in each case is different:
Canadian courts have stated in a number of cases the test to
be applied in determining whether disclosure is complete.
The applicant must disclose everything that is essential for
the invention to function properly. To be complete, it must
meet two conditions: it must describe the invention and
define the way it is produced or built...The applicant must
define the nature of the invention and describe how it is put
into operation. A failure to meet the first condition would
invalidate the application for ambiguity, while a failure to
meet the second invalidates it for insufficiency.[Emphasis
added]76

The distinction has also been stated thus:
Insufficiency is directed to whether the specification is
sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to understand
how the subject matter of the patent is to be made;
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Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1989), 25 CPR (3d) 257

(SCC) [Pioneer Hi-Bred] at 267-268.
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ambiguity is directed to the issue as to whether the scope of
the monopoly can be understood.77

Ambiguity has been described as a “last resort” and rarely to
be used. A Court should not find a claim ambiguous where it can be
construed in a meaningful way.78
The Supreme Court described the sufficiency requirement in

Consolboard:
Section 36 of the Patent Act lies at the heart of the whole
patent system. The description of the invention therein
provided for is the quid pro quo for which the inventor is
given a monopoly for a limited term of years on the
invention.…The consideration for the grant is twofold:
"first, there must be a new and useful invention, and
secondly, the inventor, must, in return for the grant of a
patent, give to the public an adequate description of the
invention with sufficiently complete and accurate details as
will enable a workman, skilled in the art to which the
invention relates, to construct or use that invention when
the period of the monopoly has expired".79

Insufficiency is a technical attack that should not operate to
defeat a patent for a meritorious invention, but the attack will succeed
where a person skilled in the art cannot put the invention into
practice.80
XII
SUFFICIENCY AND AMBIGUITY AND SELECTION PATENTS
In Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.81, Hughes J. found
allegations that a selection patent was invalid justified on the basis of

Hughes & Woodley, supra note 30 at §34.
See Hughes & Woodley, supra note 30 at §33 and case law cited therein.
79 Consolboard, supra note 54 at 154-155.
80 See Hughes & Woodley, supra note 30 at §34 and case law cited therein.
81 (2007), 58 CPR (4th) 214 (FCTD) [ Eli Lilly].
77
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insufficiency.82 Eli Lilly brought an application to prohibit the
Minister of Health from issuing a NOC to Novopharm in respect of
tablets for oral administration of drugs containing certain dosages of
olanzapine, marketed by Eli Lilly as ZYPREXA. In its Notice of
Allegation, Novopharm alleged invalidity of Canadian patent
2,041,113 (the “113 Patent”). This patent for olanzapine was a
selection with respect to Canadian patent 1,075,687, which disclosed a
vast number of compounds (15 trillion).
The validity of the 113 Patent had previously been considered
in another application under the PM(NOC) Regulations brought in
response to a Notice of Allegation issued by Apotex. In this previous
application, Gauthier J. granted an order of prohibition, finding that
the allegations made by Apotex in respect to the issue of validity of
the 113 Patent were not justified.83 In the earlier decision, the grounds
of invalidity raised were anticipation, obviousness, double patenting
and an allegation of misleading description under section 53 of the
Act. Hughes J. considered that there were two invalidity issues raised
beyond those considered by Gauthier J.: sufficiency and utility.84
The claims at issue recited the chemical formula for
olanzapine, along with a use and composition thereof. Hughes J.
summarized the construction of the claims provided by Gauthier J. as
follows:
Thus, the construction put on the claims by Justice Gauthier
was that they were directed to olanzapine as an
antipsychotic agent, that, in a clinical situation, had a better
overall profile than previously known antipsychotic agents
(including those of the „687 Patent) because of a number of
factors, at least five, and possibly six if cholesterol levels
were included as a factor. She found no need to determine if
cholesterol levels were essential for the purposes of
constructions when addressing the reason of obviousness.85

An appeal of this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal was dismissed as moot on
the basis that a NOC had already issued to Novopharm after the decision of Hughes J.:
see supra, note 15.
83 58 CPR (4th) 353 (FCTD), aff‟d 68 CPR (4th) 167 (FCA).
84 Eli Lilly, supra note 81 at 230.
85 Ibid. at 242.
82
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Hughes J. agreed with Gauthier J.‟s findings with respect to
anticipation, obviousness and double patenting. Turning to the issue
of sufficiency, Hughes J. considered that the general jurisprudence as
to sufficiency of disclosure had to be considered in light of the
particular requirements of selection patents:
The question of sufficiency of disclosure when it comes to
the selection patents…has particular importance. The
general jurisprudence as to sufficiency of disclosure must be
considered in light of the particular requirements respecting
selection patents that the inventive feature of selection of a
compound or group of compounds from a larger group must
reside in the unexpected or surprising attributes of the
selected compound or groups and that this inventive feature
must be clearly set out in the specification. [Emphasis
added]86

Hughes J. identified the discussion of Dickson J. in the
Supreme Court decision of Consolboard, with respect to disclosure of
the utility in the specification as giving rise to difficulties when
considering a selection patent. In particular, the statement that it is a
requirement that an invention possess utility, but that the patentee is
not required in the disclosure to describe in what way the invention is
new or to extol the effect or advantage thereof.87
Interestingly, Hughes J. went on to cite the following passage
in Pioneer Hi-Bred where the Supreme Court distinguished the
difference between ambiguity and utility:
…The applicant must disclose everything that is essential
for the invention to function properly. To be complete, it
must meet two conditions: it must describe the invention
and define the way it is produced or built ... The applicant
must define the nature of the invention and describe how it
is put into operation. A failure to meet the first condition
would invalidate the application for ambiguity, while a
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failure to meet the second
insufficiency…[Citations omitted]88

invalidates

it

for

Hughes J. held that mere statement of advantage was
insufficient:
A patentee cannot merely state that the selected compound
or group has advantages. The patentee must state clearly
what the invention is, namely the specific advantages… 89

However, it is difficult to ascertain from the decision what
amounts to a “clear statement” such as to render the patent disclosure
sufficient.
Hughes J. however appears to commingle the issue of
sufficiency with ambiguity:
The discussion as to sufficiency elsewhere in those Reasons
is directed to whether the patentee put enough into the
specification so as to enable a person skilled in the art to
clearly identify and understand the invention. Intention so
as to deliberately mislead is not an element in considering
sufficiency. [Emphasis added]90

As discussed above, the requirement to identify the invention
is not an issue of sufficiency, but of ambiguity.
In fact, failure to clearly define the advantage (or,
alternatively stated, to define the inventive concept) as giving rise to
an ambiguity problem was recognized as long ago as in Re IG
Farbenindustrie AG:
I must add a word on the subject of the drafting of the
specification of such a patent. It should be obvious, after
what I have said as to the essence of the inventive step, that
it is necessary for the patentee to define in clear terms the

Ibid. at 258-259, citing Pioneer Hi-Bred, supra note 76.
Eli Lilly, supra note 81 at 261.
90 Ibid. at 270.
88
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nature of the characteristic which he alleges to be possessed
by the selection for which he claims a monopoly. He has in
truth disclosed no invention whatever if he merely says that
the selected group possesses advantages. Apart altogether
from the question of what is called sufficiency, he must
disclose an invention; he fails to do this in the case of a
selection for special characteristics, if he does not
adequately define them. The cautions repeatedly expressed
in the House of Lords as regards ambiguity, have, I think,
special weight in relation to selections patents… [Emphasis
added]91

Support for the proposition that insufficiency may not be the
most appropriate ground on which to challenge a patent for “improper
selection” can be found in the decision of Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Health)92 (referred to here as Pfizer v. Ranbaxy to
distinguish it from other cases with Pfizer in the style of cause). The
Federal Court of Appeal considered the decision of the Applications
Judge finding allegations of invalidity of a selection patent justified
based on lack of sufficiency. The case involved a selection patent for
the selection from a genus patent to cholesterol lowering statin
compounds. The selection patent claimed pharmaceutically acceptable
salts of atorvastatin, including the calcium salt marketed under the
brand name LIPITOR.93 The Notice of Allegation alleged invalidity for
obviousness, double patenting, insufficiency and anticipation.

91
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Farbenindustrie, supra note 3 at 323.
(2008) 67 CPR (4th) 23 (FCA) [Pfizer v. Ranbaxy].

The validity of the „546 Patent (LIPITOR) was also considered in the decision of
Barnes J. in Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2008), 64 CPR (4th) 1
(FCTD). (This decision was released prior to the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal in Pfizer v. Ranbaxy). Barnes J. refused to issue an order prohibiting the
Minister from issuing an NOC to the respondent Apotex on the basis that allegations
of invalidity were justified. Barnes J. characterized the issues raised in the Notice of
Allegation (“NOA”) as “substantive validity issues of selection, double patenting,
obviousness and anticipation”, but only dealt with the issues of the sufficiency of the
NOA and the validity of the selection. In regards to the validity of the selection,
Barnes J. characterized the issue as follows:
[T]he principal question for determination is whether Pfizer has
established that atorvastatin calcium has surprising or unexpected
advantages sufficient to meet the legal requirements for a valid
selection.
93
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Citing Consolboard, Nadon J. for the Court of Appeal noted
that subsection 27(3) of the Act does not require a patent to describe
its advantages.94 However, Nadon J. noted that the Federal Court had
approved on a number of occasions of the statement of Lord Diplock
in the selection case of Beecham Group Ltd. v. Bristol Laboratories
International S.A.95 that “the quid pro quo for the monopoly granted
to the inventor is the public disclosure by him in his specification of
the special advantages that the selected members of the class
possess”.96 While noting commentary suggesting that the disclosure
requirements may be a bit more onerous for selection patents, Nadon
J. also noted that the Court had considered selection patents in only
two cases and it did not in either case suggest a higher level of
disclosure was required.97
Nadon J. went on to characterize the challenges made by
Ranbaxy to the validity of the patent:
Ranbaxy challenges the promise made by Pfizer in the 546
patent that atorvastatin displays unexpected and surprising
increase in activity over the racemate. It does so by
attacking the reliability of the data that underlies this
promise.98

Ranbaxy alleged the data provided in the patent description
was not representative of all the data collected by Pfizer and was
unreliable and that more reliable data obtained by Pfizer, but not
supportive of the inventive advantage, was not included within the
description. Nadon J. then found that such allegations were not
properly characterized as allegations of insufficiency:

Barnes J.‟s decision does not explicitly address whether “invalid selection” is a stand
alone ground of invalidity or whether it merely shorthand for an allegation made
under one of the existing grounds of invalidity. The decision would appear to find
basis in insufficiency and anticipation and/or obviousness: see paragraphs [115], [118]
and [120].
94 Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, supra note 92 at 36.
95 [1978] R.P.C. 521.
96 Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, supra note 92 at 37.
97 Ibid. at 37-38.
98 Ibid. at 41.
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These allegations, although placed under a heading entitled
"sufficiency" in the NOA, have, in my respectful view,
nothing to do with the disclosure requirement under
subsection 27(3) of the Act. Rather, they are relevant to an
analysis of the utility, novelty and/or obviousness of a
patent. This is clear from the first paragraph of the NOA
cited above, according to which "[t]he disclosure does not
support there being any novel or inventive aspect as
claimed". What Ranbaxy is really challenging in its NOA
under the heading of "sufficiency" is the fact that Pfizer
obtained a selection patent without having provided
reliable data showing that the narrow class of compounds
selected was better than the compounds covered by the
genus patent.99 [Emphasis added]

The Court held that the Applications Judge had wrongly
interpreted the disclosure requirements of subsection 27(3) of the Act:
The Applications Judge was wrong in interpreting the
disclosure requirement of subsection 27(3) of the Act as
requiring that a patentee back up his invention by data. By
so doing, he confused the requirements that an invention be
new, useful and non-obvious with the requirement under
subsection 27(3) that the specification disclose the "use" to
which the inventor conceived the invention could be put:
see Consolboard, supra, at 527. Whether or not a patentee
has obtained enough data to substantiate its invention is, in
my view, an irrelevant consideration with respect to the
application of subsection 27(3). An analysis thereunder is
concerned with the sufficiency of the disclosure, not the
sufficiency of the data underlying the invention. Allowing
Ranbaxy to attack the utility, novelty and/or obviousness of
the 546 patent through the disclosure requirement unduly
broadens the scope of an inventor's obligation under
subsection 27(3) and disregards the purpose of this
provision.100
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The Court characterized the standard to be applied under
subsection 27(3) as follows:
Only two questions are relevant for the purpose of
subsection 27(3) of the Act. What is the invention? How
does it work?: see Consolboard, supra, at 520. In the case of
selection patents, answering the question "What is the
invention?" involves disclosing the advantages conferred by
the selection. If the patent specification (disclosure and
claims) answers these questions, the inventor has held his
part of the bargain. In the case at bar, the 546 patent
answers each of these questions.

What is the invention? The invention consists of having
identified an enantiomer, and in particular the calcium salt
of that enantiomer, that is better at inhibiting the
biosynthesis of cholesterol than would be expected, given
the common knowledge and prior art at the time of
application for the patent.

How does it work? The 546 patent sets out the methods for
producing the compounds covered by the patent.101

Nadon J. went on to conclude that the fact that there was no
disclosure of a justification for why the calcium salt of atorvastatin
was the preferred embodiment did not render the disclosure
insufficient:
When read as a whole, a skilled reader would understand
the patent as claiming that the calcium salt of atorvastatin is
the compound covered by the 546 patent that demonstrates
the most surprising and unexpected inhibition of
cholesterol biosynthesis because it has the most preferred
physical properties. Pfizer was not required to include in
the 546 patent data which supports its statement that the
calcium salt of atorvastatin is the preferred embodiment of
the invention, nor was it required to explain why the
calcium salt was the preferred embodiment.102

101
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Ibid. at 44.
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The Court noted that the requirement to be truthful and not
misleading is not covered by subsection 27(3), but subsection 53(1) of
the Act.103
Nadon J. went on to note that Ranbaxy had not challenged the
sufficiency of the data underlying the invention under the headings of
obviousness, double patenting or anticipation and the Notice of
Allegation was therefore insufficient to challenge the patent on this
basis.
Nadon J. did not exclude the possibility that a lack of data to
support a claimed advantage could form the basis of a validity
challenge:
An attack on a selection patent on the basis that there is no
data to support the claimed advantage is certainly relevant
for the purposes of validity (most likely to the question of
utility), but it is not relevant with respect to disclosure
under subsection 27(3) of the Act.104

XIII
SELECTION PATENTS AND THE SOUND PREDICTION ANALYSIS
The Federal Court recently considered the ZYPREXA patent
again in the context of an infringement action brought by Eli Lilly
against Novopharm.105 This decision is currently under appeal.
Novopharm attacked the patent on a number of grounds including
anticipation, double-patenting, and obviousness. O‟Reilly J. purported
to make his decision based on a ground of invalidity that he described
as “invalid selection”.106 A review of the reasons for decision, however,
reveals a utility analysis made with respect to the advantage(s) of the
selected compound.
O‟Reilly J. identified a three step analysis:

Ibid. at 43.
Ibid. at 45.
105 Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. (2009), 78 CPR (4th) 1 (FCTD) [ Eli Lilly,
infringement proceeding].
106 Ibid. at 7.
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Therefore, the first step I must take is to decide whether
one or more of the asserted advantages of olanzapine was
known to exist, or was soundly predicted, at the time the
'113 patent was filed in 1991. Second, I must decide
whether at least one of them could be considered a
substantial advantage over the '687 compounds and
somewhat peculiar to olanzapine. And, if so, the third
question is whether the disclosure of that substantial and
special advantage in the '113 patent was adequate. If I
decide any one of them in the negative, I must find the '113
patent to be invalid.107

O‟Reilly J. identified from the patent four advantages relative
to the compounds of the genus 687 Patent and, in particular,
flumezapine and ethyl olanzapine, for which comparative data was
provided in the 113 Patent.108 Interestingly, O‟Reilly J. went on to
identify additional advantages in respect of “prior known
antipsychotic agents”, noting that flumezapine and ethyl olanzapine
had not been “used for the treatment of schizophrenia or any other
condition”:
In my view, reading the '113 patent as a whole, the skilled
reader, aware of the '687 patent, would interpret the alleged
superiority of olanzapine over other antipsychotic drugs on
the market as being another major advantage of olanzapine
over the other '687 compounds.109

With respect to prior known antipsychotic agents, O‟Reilly J.
identified four specific comparisons.110
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Ibid. at 18.
Ibid. at 17 [(i) has lower elevations of liver enzymes than flumezapine, (ii) lower

elevations of CPK than flumezapine; (iii) less EPS liability than flumezapine; and (iv)
does not elevate cholesterol; but ethyl olanzapine does.].
109 Ibid. at 17-18.
110 Ibid. [(i) high level of efficacy at low doses; (ii) lower elevation of prolactin; (iii)
lower EPS liability; and (iv) no alteration of white blood cell count.].
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In the first step of the analysis - deciding whether one or more
of the asserted advantages of olanzapine was known to exist, or was
soundly predicted - a sound prediction analysis (a utility analysis) was
made of each of the advantages identified. O‟Reilly J. found there was
a lack of factual basis for each advantage or a prediction thereof, or a
sound line of reasoning from which the advantage could be soundly
predicted from the facts provided.
In the second step of the analysis, O‟Reilly J. considered the
question of whether at least one advantage could be considered a
substantial advantage over the genus compounds and somewhat
peculiar to olanzapine. O‟Reilly J. held the comparisons made “did not
relate to the class as a whole” and that he had “no evidence that any
advantage was peculiar to olanzapine.”111 Clearly with a genus patent
of 15 trillion compounds, comparative data across the class would be
impossible. O‟Reilly J. seemed to place significance on the
comparisons in the 113 patent being made to “failed compounds”,112
although this hardly seems significant given that the selection is from
a genus of “unselected” compounds.
O‟Reilly J. adopted something akin to a utility analysis under
this step of the analysis:
The invention described in the '687 patent was a class of
compounds that would be useful in the treatment of
psychotic conditions and acute mania, and that would have
low EPS liability. By contrast, the invention described in
the '113 patent is a drug that is safer and more effective in
the clinical treatment of patients than other antipsychotic
drugs on the market. This is clearly a substantial advantage
that would set olanzapine apart from the rest of the '687
class. However, as outlined above, the broad assertion in the
'113 patent was unsupportable at the time Lilly applied for
it.113

Ibid. at 36.
Ibid. at 37.
113 Ibid.
111
112
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The advantage would only be incapable of support (i.e. would
be unsupportable) if it was not demonstrated or predictable at the
time the application was applied for (i.e. if it the test for utility could
not be satisfied.)
Under the third step of the analysis, O‟Reilly J. identified two
disclosure obligations: the duty to set out the basis on which
olanzapine is believed to have a substantial and peculiar advantage
over the 687 compounds and the duty to set out the basis for the
sound prediction for that advantage. O‟Reilly J. found the two
disclosure requirements to be “coextensive” and not satisfied.114
It is interesting to contrast the outcome in this case with that
of a recent United Kingdom (UK) Court of Appeal decision where the
corresponding patent for ZYPREXA was upheld.115 The patent was
challenged for anticipation and obviousness over a prior Eli Lilly
specification that disclosed the genus and also for obviousness in view
of a piece of non-patent prior art. Eli Lilly also sought to defend the
patent as a valid “selection patent”. Considering the law of selection
patents as laid down in I.G. Farbenindustrie‟s Patents,116 the Court
relegated these rules to old law.117 The Master of the Rolls noted that
the 1977 UK Patent Act “was expressly enacted to create a “new”
regime for patents” and was “intended to be interpreted in accordance
with the EPC”.118 Noting that selection patent rules from I.G.
Farbenindustrie‟s Patents did not form part of the European Patent
Office (EPO) Guidelines for Examination and had not been applied in
an EPO Board of Appeal decision cited to them, Lord Justice Jacob in a
concurring decision held them no longer part of UK patent law.119
The Court adopted an obviousness approach based on the
practice of the EPO Boards when analyzing claims for a product or
class of products falling within a greater class.120
Lord Justice Jacob characterized the standard applied by the
EPO:
Ibid. at 39.
Dr Reddy‟s Laboratories (UK) Limited v. Eli Lilly and Company Limited , [2009]
EWCA Civ 1362 (hereinafter “Dr Reddy‟s”).
116 I.G. Farbenindustrie, supra.
117 Dr Reddy‟s, supra at para 37.
118 Ibid. at para 103.
119 Ibid. at para 37.
120 Ibid. at para 40.
114
115
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What then does the EPO do? The answer is essentially this:
that it regards what can fairly be regarded as a mere
arbitrary selection from a class as obvious. If there is no
more than an arbitrary selection then there is simply no
technical contribution provided by the patentee. 121

While the Master of the Rolls noted that in some cases the
Board had indicated that a selection patent must show that the
selected compound has an advantage which other compounds do not
have, the requirement can be satisfied by comparing the claimed
compound with the closest prior art, i.e. structurally the most similar
compound in the group from which the claimed compound has been
selected.122
The Court rejected the proposition that the selection of
olanzapine was arbitrary and held the patent not obvious in view of
the genus specification.123
Lord Justice Jacob noted the trial Judge‟s conclusion that if it
been necessary to shown compliance with the I.G. Farbenindustrie‟s
Patents rules, the patent failed to do so, but observed that this showed
that the rules were too strict:
It shows, to my mind, that the rules are too strict. They
would mean that a technical advance of the sort made by
Lilly would be unpatentable. That in turn would mean that
it would not be worthwhile doing the sort of thing that
Lilly did by developing the disclosure of their Patent
further and bringing olanzapine to market. Unpatentability
would have meant this medicine would not have been
available.124

In the Canadian case, O‟Reilly J. also considered the question
of inventiveness, but came to a different conclusion.125 O‟Reilly J. did
not conclude “that the selection of olanzapine as a development
compound was an obvious choice” noting that “olanzapine was not
Ibid. at para 44.
Ibid at para 112.
123 Ibid. at paras 53 to 58 and paras 110 and 111.
124 Ibid. at paras 77 to 78.
125 Eli Lilly, infringement proceeding , supra note 105 at 41.
121
122
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the only candidate under consideration, and did not even appear to be
particularly active” and it “was not "more or less self-evident" that
olanzapine would work.”126 However, he found the testing of
olanzapine to be “routine”:
Lilly had merely carried out routine testing of olanzapine's
properties. It had some early signals of safety and efficacy in
a few small studies of healthy volunteers and patients. Lilly
scientists showed persistence, diligence and sound science
in getting olanzapine that far. New methods of synthesis
had to be worked out (after an explosion in the lab during
synthesis of flumezapine). But that is not enough for a
patent. There must be an invention. And, in the context of a
selection patent, the invention is the discovery of
unexpected, substantial and special advantages. 127

In an introductory portion of his decision, O‟Reilly J.
described the development of olanzapine in the years following the
1975 filing of the genus 687 Patent. Testing on ethyl flumezapine was
wound down in 1978 and clinical trials on flumezapine were halted in
1982 after receiving reports of elevated liver enzymes and the muscle
enzyme CPK in some patients. Olanzapine was first synthesized
shortly after the discontinuation of flumezapine. O‟Reilly J. noted that
at first olanzapine was not considered by all researchers to be a good
choice for development and testing was ongoing until filing of the
patent application in 1983.128 He summarized the testing that had
been performed at the time of filing:
By the time it filed the '113 patent, Lilly had received the
results of its healthy volunteer studies, as well as some
preliminary data from its clinical trials. It had also
concluded a six-month study in dogs. The patent mentions
these studies and provides some general information about
what they disclosed.129

Ibid. at 41.
Ibid. at 40-41.
128 Ibid. at 10-12.
129 Ibid. at 12.
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If the choice of olanzapine was not obvious, characterizing the
years of product development as entirely routine so as to make a
finding of obviousness would seem to be a high standard to apply.
The stringency with which the sound prediction standard is
applied (if at all) will influence the result in this type of decision.
Particularly in a case such as ZYPREXA, where a selection is made
from an enormous genus and the selection has merit, it would seem
appropriate to have some deference to the expertise of the applicant in
making the selection based on the testing performed. In this regard,
the patenting of arbitrary choices for which there is no evidence to
predict advantageous properties over the genus would clearly be
precluded by practical considerations. Also, given that “the same
rules” are to apply to selection patents, the broad definition of utility
from Consolboard, which includes affording the public a useful choice
could still be relevant.130 In the ZYPREXA context, identifying a
compound from a vast class and demonstrating its clinical potential in
early clinical trials arguably affords the public a new and useful
choice, while requiring proof of a superior side effects profile and
clinical utility applies a higher standard to selection patents.
XIV
CONCLUDING NOTE
The Supreme Court decision of Sanofi-Synthelabo established
the tests to be applied in assessing the novelty and inventiveness of a
selection patent. The decision clarified that in the case of a true
selection, there is no anticipation because the genus patent will not
satisfy the disclosure requirement of the anticipation test. In the case
of obviousness, the inventive concept of the claims may be ascertained
with reference to the specification. The inventive concept can be
found in the special advantage of the selected compound. With respect
to double patenting, if the claims of a selection patent are novel and
inventive over the genus patent, the patent will not be invalid for
double patenting: the claims are not to the same invention, the claims
of the genus patent are broader than those of the selection patent. If
the inventive concept or advantage cannot be ascertained, there is no
inventive concept and the patent may be invalid for obviousness. An
130
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inability to ascertain the inventive concept of a claim presumably also
means such a claim would be invalid for ambiguity. If the invention
does not fulfil the “promise” of the selection patent (i.e. the stated
advantage), it may be invalid for lack of utility. Testing and evidence
thereof may be required where the patentee is relying on sound
prediction to establish that its selection has some unexpected
advantage over the genus; however, this proposition is presently under
appeal. An allegation of improper selection can be considered mere
“shorthand” for alleging one of the existing applicable grounds of
invalidity. Clearly identifying, expressing and assessing these grounds
of invalidity could lead to more doctrinal clarity and jurisprudential
development of these existing grounds, while ensuring that selection
patents continue to be subject to the same rules that apply to other
types of patents.
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